One of my
earliest lessons learned was to avoid creating the appearance of competition
between traditional financial measures and their new non-financial siblings.
It therefore seemed logical to integrate the scorecard into Analog's existing
financial reporting system. This took on two forms: inclusion in the
"Red Book" and Analog's online Executive Information System (EIS)
called "IMAGE." The Red Book was the quarterly financial report
(in a red binder, of course) that was prepared principally for the Board of
Directors. IMAGE was a mainframe based data warehouse and graphics system,
used almost entirely by headquarters personnel, which could only be accessed in
graphics form through hardwired remote color terminals.
in February 1988, we included in the Red Book and IMAGE our corporate and
divisional scorecards as well as our delivery performance metrics, which had
already been included in IMAGE since late 1986.
Because of inadequacies in the IMAGE system, we soon purchased Pilot
Executive Software's Executive Information System. PILOT maintained all
data on the mainframe (to assure its integrity) but the bulk of the graphics
were done on local PC’s that could connect to the mainframe using modems over
local phone lines. By the end of 1988, we had completed the transition
from the IMAGE to the PILOT delivery platform. To the user, the transition
was transparent with regard to content and the various displays. However,
navigation was now by mouse click and hardcopy could be generated at the PC's
Plans for expansion of the IMAGE/PILOT system included drilldown to lower level scorecards (the system only drilled down one level below the corporate scorecard), which would be inputted and maintained by its owner. We also planned to link PILOT to Lotus Notes for further expansion of the scorecard commentaries and integration into our meeting agendas and agenda item preparation materials.
a February 1990 interview that appeared in ComputerWorld, I described our
adaptation of a traditional financial EIS to non-financial metrics and the
balanced scorecard and my expectation that it would eventually replace our
traditional financial-only management system. Shortly after that, I was
invited to be a plenary speaker at the Institute of Management Sciences DSS-90
Conference. What follows are the materials that I used in that
of the other speakers at DSS-90, Jack Rockart, the Director of MIT's renowned
Center for Information Systems Research (CISR), came to visit me on June 21,
1990 for a first-hand demo of PILOT. Jack was often referred to as the
"father of EIS" so his visit and compliments were much appreciated.
Jack invited me to speak at a CISR seminar held in December 1990. A month
earlier, I had made a similar presentation at a seminar sponsored by Decision
Support Technology, Inc. In both of
these later presentations I uses updated versions of the relevant materials
final tribute came in the fall of 1991 with Bob Kaplan's acceptance of my offer
to set up a full working version of our system on the Harvard Business School's
computer so that students could use it in conjunction with the Analog Devices
case that he had recently written. David Friend, CEO of Pilot Executive
Software, agreed to provide support and a free copy of his software. The
three-way team of ADI-HBS-PES personnel did a masterful job of creating a
working demo (much like the one on this website), which from all reports added
significant value to the student's learning experience.
The first part of this presentation provides an overview of ADI and a description of the key elements of our QIP efforts. You can skip ahead to slide 20 where the description of the PILOT system starts.
This slide was used to demonstrate the changing nature of Analog’s competition. In previous years, our major competitors were much smaller companies (Burr-Brown, Precision Monolithics, Crystal, Linear Technology, etc.), but as the technology changed, so did the competition. Now it included the powerhouse global semiconductor companies.
This slide was used to portray the kind of corporate culture that we were attempting to create. It provided the context for the model of partnership between the IS function as supplier and the QIP function as its customer that I was going to describe.
I had often described Information Systems as the “glue” that held together the three major elements of QIP. I used this slide to describe IS’s central role in dealing with such information based activities as metrics and scorecard management, project management and communications as a driver of the desired culture change.
As a prelude to our approach to creating the management information system that I was about to describe, I used this slide to describe the approach that we would be taking. I stressed the importance of a systematic, data driven, team based model. Since the audience for this presentation was principally IT professionals, I used the next several slides to provide a context for what we were trying to accomplish.
This slide stressed the importance of metrics and goals in Analog’s implementation of TQM. I also stressed that although they were necessary, they were not sufficient to assure achievement of our overall business objectives.
In later versions of this slide, I added: “If you don’t monitor it, it will get worse” to emphasize the importance of integration of measurement into the normal management systems.
This slide introduced the comprehensive set of measures that Analog developed for its order fulfillment process. Not only did we measure our overall performance in terms of late shipments, but also we recognized the emerging customer requirement that we not ship early either. To start the journey to root causes, we measured responsibility of the late shipment. The lateness/earliness measures addressed the “societal loss” associated with not being on time. To a customer, responsiveness (an other emerging customer requirement) took the form of how quickly we made a delivery commitment after their initial query.
This slide showed the rapid improvement that we were achieving in our most important order fulfillment process metric.
Having established the kind of information we would be dealing with as well as how we were using this information in the management of our business, I next introduced to the audience the cross-functional team that was currently given the responsibility of developing and implementing our system.
The team consisted of three members from my staff and three members from our Corporate Information Systems group (which reported to Analog’s CFO) as well as me. My job was to assure that the team’s product met the needs of all users of the system and to obtain the needed resources.
Our efforts at using information systems to manage our metrics and scorecard actually started in late 1986. Team membership changed as members moved on to other assignments, but always consisted of a similar mix of individuals.
This is page one (of two) of the first screen in the resulting system. It’s the Corporate Balanced Scorecard for the first quarter of 1990. I refer you to the working model of Pilot for a detailed description of the navigation rules for the system.
The next slide contains the second page. Two pages (rather than the one page I normally required) were necessary to assure legibility on all of our computer monitors. Today, both screens would easily fit on a single page.
From the original creation of these data in late 1986/early 1987, I was sent each month a set of transparencies of the major “screens” in the system. I would replace the old ones withy the new ones, so that I could always show people our latest results. This, and the following slides represent a snapshot of the contents of my “transparency folder” as of April 1990. I brought it to all meetings and could quickly retrieve the appropriate data when it was appropriate.
on On Time Delivery %
Clicking on any of the numbers in the previous slide (here it’s “not late” for the entire corporation) produces this standardized view. The metric is broken down by business unit (each column) and shows the most recent twelve months of results. The green “control limits” identify the band of statistical insignificance in month-to-month variation. The red line is a fit of my half-life model to the data. The resulting half-life is shown at the bottom of each column. If the half-life is statistically insignificant (r2< .3), the letters NS (i.e. not significant) appear in place of a numerical value. If the half-life is negative or greater than 5 years, than NA (for not applicable) appears. Clicking on a half-life value produces the next slide.
This slide shows that during the period of May 1989 through April of 1990, Analog’s rate of improvement was rapidly declining. This plateuing in improvement is discussed in several my other presentations.
Our system was not only an EIS with predetermined views, but also a data warehouse where a wide variety of measures could be viewed through a process call “slice and dice.” The user specified the Analog business unit, specific customer (if in the top 400) or customer category, product or product category, and time frame and then chose from a large variety of order fulfillment process measures.
Here’s the first page of specific measures available in the system.
This is the first page of choices for customer category and specific top customers.
Here’s an example of Analogs overall performance to Hewlett-Packard for OEM (specialty) and Distribution (commodity) products for the month of April 1990. Again, by clicking on a number, its time history would be displayed.
This is the twelve-month time history of Hewlett-Packard’s requested leadtime (customer request date minus order entry date) for Analog’s specialty products.
When meeting with customers. I always brought a set of customer specific results. Usually, it was the first time that they had seen actual data on our performance. In one case, a large German electronics customer who considered us to be one of their worst suppliers based entirely on anecdotal evidence moved us to the top of the list of their best suppliers after seeing our actual data.
In another case, Hewlett-Packard, we agreed to use our data at our regular quarterly meetings rather than their own internally generated numbers since they considered ours to be far more accurate and comprehensive.
From my frequent visits with customers, I discovered that many of them had vendor-rating systems in place. A surprising number of them didn’t share this data with their suppliers. In other cases, the data was sent to an Analog salesperson where it subsequently disappeared. I started collecting these data and published a quarterly report of our aggregate performance as measured by our customers.
Here’s the data for February 1990. The correlation of both level and half-life with our own internally generated numbers validated our internally generated view of our performance.
Here’s an example of one key customer’s view of our performance improvement. HP’s vender ranking system placed us in the middle of the pack of its 1986 16 linear IC suppliers. The same year, they announced that they would be consolidating their number of suppliers by 50%. We made the cut and in 1987 ranked fifth of their now eight linear IC suppliers. Keeping the pressure on, they announced that they would no longer treat linear and digital ICs separately, and we moved to fifth place in this augmented supplier group. In 1989, we tied for the first place ranking in a further reduced qualified supplier pool.
In creating and implementing our non-financial performance measurement information system, our team, particularly the CIS based members, learned many important lessons. The most important lesson was that our customers had to perceive that the system really helped them to do a better job, in other words it satisfied a real and significant customer need.
I made this slide, the final slide in my presentation, after our newly hired CIS Director met with me and complained about my role in championing our purchase of PILOT’s EIS. He made the first statement in no uncertain terms. My response, the second quote, was instantly rebuffed. The “IS curtain,” which had all but disappeared, instantly returned. I hope that some of his counterparts in the audience had a more favorable reaction to this slide and to our team’s accomplishment. I am certain that without our customer-supplier partnership the resulting output would have been far less useful.
Last modified: August 13, 2006