A Strategy Map (aka strategy
linkage diagram, strategy tree, scorecard story, etc.) is a visual tool that
is used in telling the balanced scorecard
"story". This story provides the answer to the question in the
back of every employees mind: "why are we doing this?" To achieve
the aggressive goals that are identified on the scorecard requires an effort on
the part of employees that is above and beyond their daily job. Much
individual creativity is needed to "make it happen." A
compelling, logical story provides the necessary motivation.
One current model, borrows from a framework developed in System Dynamics and
popularized by the proponents of systems thinking and organizational learning:
the causal-loop diagram. It superimposes this diagram on a fixed framework
that spans the financial-customer-internal-learning and growth system of
classification. It then provides a generic causal linkage: "by
doing/improving this (a learning and growth metric), we improve our internal
processes as evidenced by improvement in this (an internal process metric),
which in turn improves this customer requirement (a customer metric) which leads
to improved financial performance (a financial metric). Analog took a more
holistic view in developing the one slide summary of its balanced scorecard
story.
Analog's tool for telling the scorecard story originated in 1986, upon my
return form Juran's Impro 86 (see Evolution of
Analog's Strategy Map).
I was inspired by a booth and presentation given by Texas Instruments' Hiji
Japan wafer fab. I summarized their story on a single slide and than
created a fictitious version were I adapted the original to Analog's largest, and
a strikingly similar, wafer fab. The message was clear: here's a possible
future state for Analog, and ... someone's already there. This instantly
reduced my proposal from a consultants pipedream to a realistic
possibility. The excitement that these two slides produced, prompted me to
create a third version which applied to Analog's IC operations in total.
Over the next few weeks, this slide evolved into a two slide version:
the first describing what was possible by 1992 (which I called the External
Perspective), and the second one addressing how we could do it (which I called
the Internal Perspective). The combination of possibilities, the resulting
opportunities and the required framework served as the basis for this early
story. In January of 1990, I combined the previous two slides onto a
single slide, pared the drivers down to the vital few and added the three
business objectives. By April of 1990, the external perspective had to be
broadened to include the newly emerging requirements of price and
responsiveness.
My final version of this slide, created in April of 1990, provided the
visual for many presentations:

The symbol in the upper left hand corner of this slide is the QIP logo (see: The
QIP Logo). Throughout my tenure at Analog, the management group
continually asked and re-asked the question "what are the most important
things that we need to do to delight all of our stakeholders, taken as a
group?" The highest common denominator of the many answers to that
question always remained the three business objectives stated on this
slide. And over that period, the principal bottleneck in achieving those
business objectives was customer satisfaction.
Now today things might be different at Analog. More than a hundred fold
increase in stockholder value (that's right folks, 11/2/90 stock price: 15/16ths
(split adjusted), 6/19/00: 98 ) has been created and customers are lining up to buy
their products (leadtimes on some released products are being quoted in years,
rather than weeks). So
employee satisfaction, given the tight labor market and the allure of current
batch of high tech
startups, might have risen to the top of the list. But then, it was the
customer, the customer, the customer. We also knew that customers were
choosing suppliers on this elusive basis called value. The biggest challenge
we faced was defining what they meant by it, and that marked the principal way
in which the scorecard story evolved between 1986 and 1991.
But we also began to recognize that there was not a simple connection between
what we had identified as the external levers (the importance weighted gaps in
meeting customer requirements) and the internal levers (the internal processes
having the greatest effect on closing these gaps). The stumbling block in
making the connection was the absence of a one-to-one relationship between
internal and external levers. In other words, the internal lever could not
be actuated independently. For example, a person working on yield
improvement knew that their efforts would impact several external levers.
They also new that those working on other internal initiates could do the
same. They audit trail became muddy and so did the resulting story.
As a system dynamics student since the early 1970's, I was well aware of
causal-loop diagrams. But I believed then (and believe now) that they are
of very limited value in clarifying these types of multiple relationships.
Furthermore, and most importantly, they gave no indication of the strength of
the relationships. And so I turned to one of the of 7 Management and Planning
(7MP) Tools developed in Japan in the late 1970s: the Matrix Diagram. It
allowed me to pictorially capture not only the existence of a relationship, but
also its strength. The needed decoder ring was that a circle-within-circle
was used to symbolize a strong relationship, a single circle alone was for a
moderate relationship, a triangle represented a weak relationship and a blank
cell corresponded to in insignificant or nonexistent one.
This matrix proved invaluable in telling the scorecard story. Ask that
same person who's working on yield improvement "why are you doing
this?" and they'll likely tell you:
"By improving yield, and reducing yield variability I'll be helping to
improve our delivery performance and helping us to grow in new, cost competitive
markets. Also, it will help the manufacturing people reduce lead time
since they'll be better able to plan production. And the quality folks
tell me that low yields and high yield variability is an important contributor
to our defects. All of these improvements will make our customers
happier and they'll want to buy more of our products. The more they buy,
the more money we'll make and the faster we'll grow. And the more Analog
makes, the bigger my quarterly bonus and when we add that new fab, I'll have a
good chance of promotion to fab manager."
Now to me, that's the telling of a great scorecard story.